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Abstract. The main objective of this paper is to present a theoretical framework that
conceptualizes technology adoption as a decision process involving information acquisition
by farmers who face yield uncertainty and vary in their risk preferences. This is done by
integrating the microeconomic foundations used to analyze production uncertainty at
the farm level with the traditional technological adoption models. First we follow the
approach of Antle (1987) based on higher-order moments of proﬁt, which enables ﬂexible
estimation of the stochastic technology without ad hoc speciﬁcation of risk preferences.
Then individual risk preferences are derived, which are then used to explain farmer’s
decision to adopt modern water saving technologies. The proposed model is applied to a
randomly selected sample of 265 farms located in Crete, Greece. Results show that risk
preferences aﬀect the probability of adoption and provide evidence that farmers invest in
new technologies as a means of hedging against input related production risk.
Keywords: risk attitudes, technology adoption, stochastic agricultural production, moments-
based estimation.
1 Introduction
Conventional microeconomic models applied to innovations have not adequately ex-
plained the vaiation in technological adoption across frims. Numerous theoretical and
empirical studies have attempted to explain the observed patterns of technological change,
especially in agiculture, yet there is no consistent explanation why seemingly proﬁtable
technologies are sometimes not adopted by speciﬁc classes of farms. Possibly, the prob-
lem is that economic models have diﬃculty with the concept of heterogeneity. There
is considerable heterogeneity of farms with regard to demand of new technologies, but
it has been diﬃcult to develop robust models that describe the source or consequences
of this heterogeneity. One of the sources of this heterogeneity is risk preferences. The
adoption of new or untried technologies always involves a degree of risk and uncertainty
concerning the eﬀect of this input on the distribution of farmers’ proﬁts. In this paper
1we develop a theoretical and empirical model that aims to explain endogenous technol-
ogy adoption under production risk; the application of the model concerns adoption of
irrigation technology in agriculture.
Irrigation water is becoming an increasingly scarce resource for the agricultural sector
in many regions and countries. Common ground in past policy schemes was the develop-
ment of adequate irrigation infrastructure to guarantee the supply of irrigation water as
the demand for agricultural products continued to increase. However, these expansionary
policies have resulted in increased consumption of irrigation water by the agricultural
sector at a signiﬁcant cost and physical scarcity. Water scarcity has become an increasing
social and economic concern for the policy makers and competitive water users. Par-
ticularly, agriculture is becoming the sector to which policy makers are pointing out at
the core of the water problem. The use of modern irrigation technologies has been pro-
posed as one of several possible solutions to the problem of water resource scarcity and
environmental degradation in many agricultural areas around the world.
The empirical research of this issue followed, however, diﬀerent tracks. Based on tech-
nical grounds several studies have attempted to analyze on-farm adoption of irrigation
technologies using the engineering notion of irrigation water eﬃciency deﬁned by Whin-
lesey, McNeal and Obersinner (1986) (i.e., ratio of water stored in the crop root zone to
the total water diverted for irrigation). Moreover, by technically and economically evalu-
ating irrigation technologies, some combinations of water savings and yield increase was
found to be necessary in order to induce farmers to adopt water conserving technologies
(e.g., Coupal and Wilson, 1990; Santos, 1996; Droogers, Kite and Murray-Rust, 2000,
Arabiyat, Segarra and Johnson, 2001). Despite of the fact that these studies have been
quite appealing in analyzing the changes and the diﬀusion of irrigation technologies in
agriculture they lack economic intuition.
On the other hand, in the context of technological adoption models initiated by
Griliches (1957) pioneering work on adoption of hybrid corn in the US, the analysis
of farmer’s decision to adopt technological innovations took a diﬀerent direction. The
majority of this group of empirical research has been concerned with the socio-economic,
demographic and structural factors that determine farmer’s choice to adopt or not irriga-
tion technologies and with patterns of diﬀusion of the innovation through the population
of potential adopters over time (e.g., Fishelson and Rymon, 1989; Dinar and Zilberman,
1991; Dinar, Campbell and Zilberman, 1992; Dinar and Yaron, 1992).
Despite of the numerous studies in this area, the results of applied research are of-
ten contradictory concerning the importance and inﬂuence of any given variable used to
analyze farmer’s decision. Among the various socio-economic, structural or demographic
variables used in these studies, risk has often been considered as a major factor reducing
the rate of adoption of any kind of innovation (Jensen, 1982). Nevertheless, the issue of
risk has been rarely addressed adequately in the relevant literature. Uncertainty associ-
ated with the adoption of any kind of agricultural technology has two features: ﬁrst, the
perceived riskiness of future farm yield after adoption and second, production or price
uncertainty related with the farming itself.
Several authors have empirically investigated technology adoption and diﬀusion taking
2into account farmer’s perceptions about the degree of risk concerning future yield (e.g.,
Tsur, Sternberg and Hochman, 1990; Feder and Umali, 1993; Saha, Love and Schwart,
1994; Batz, Peters and Janssen, 1999). However, a relative dearth of research seems to ex-
ist on the perceivable link between farmer’s decision to adopt innovations and production
or price uncertainty related to agricultural production. A notable exception is the work
by Yaron, Dinar and Voet (1992) who attempted to analyze the eﬀect of price uncertainty
on the innovativeness of family farms in the Nazareth region of Israel, by including in
their technology adoption model a proxy of farmer’s risk tolerance towards output price
variability.
Risk considerations are necessary in the analysis of the agricultural sector as there
exist a number of possible cases where intelligent policy formulation should consider not
only the marginal contribution of input use to the mean of output, but also the marginal
reduction (increase) in the variance of output. The traditional approach (theoretical and
empirical) to evaluating the impact of the choice of inputs on production risk makes im-
plicit, if not explicit assumptions to the eﬀect that inputs increase risk. Examples of such
theoretical studies are Stiglitz (1974), Batra (1974) and Bardhan (1977). These studies
utilized multiplicative stochastic speciﬁcations, which are restrictive in the sense that in-
puts that marginally reduce risk are not allowed. Just and Pope (1978) who identiﬁed
this restrictiveness, proposed a more general stochastic speciﬁcation of the production
function which includes two general functions: one which speciﬁes the eﬀects of inputs
on the mean of output and another on its variance, thus allowing inputs to be either
risk-increasing or risk-decreasing.
While Just and Pope’s model is a generalization of the traditional model, as it does
not restrict the eﬀects of inputs on the variance to be related to the mean, Antle (1983,
1987) has shown that it does restrict the eﬀects of inputs across the second and higher
moments in exactly the way traditional econometric models do across all moments. Thus
Antle’s departure point was to establish a set of general conditions under which standard
econometric techniques can be used to identify and estimate risk attitude parameters as
part of a structural econometric model, under less restrictive conditions. More speciﬁcally,
Antle’s moment-based approach begins with a general parameterization of the moments
of the probability distribution of output, which allows more ﬂexible representations of
output distributions and allows the identiﬁcation of risk parameters. Moreover, Antle’s
approach places the emphasis on the distribution of risk attitudes in the population,
which constitutes a departure from existing literature which focuses on measurement of
the risk attitudes of the individual producer (see for example Hazell, 1982; Pope, 1982;
and Binswanger, 1982).
Love and Buccola (1991, 1999) also proposed an extension of Just and Pope’s model
including producers attitude toward risk in the model. They considered producers’ risk
preferences in a joint analysis of input allocation and output supply decisions. An implicit
form of the utility function was assumed. In a recent article by Kumbhakar (2002), risk
preference functions are derived without directly assuming an explicit form of the utility
function. Two sources of risk, viz., production uncertainty and technical eﬃciency, are
considered.
3The main objective of this paper is to present a theoretical framework that conceptual-
izes adoption as a decision process involving information acquisition by farmers who vary
in their risk preferences. This can be done by integrating the microeconomic foundations
used to analyze production uncertainty at the farm level with the traditional technological
adoption models. Speciﬁcally, Antle’s (1987) approach which enables ﬂexible estimation
of the stochastic technology is used to evaluate individual risk preferences which then can
be used to evaluate farmer’s decision to adopt modern water saving technologies. The
proposed model is applied to a randomly selected sample of 265 farms located in Crete,
Greece.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical frame-
work used to analyze farmer’s decision in the presence of production uncertainty. The data
used in this study and the empirical model are discussed in Section 3 while the empirical
results are analyzed in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes and concludes the paper.
2 Theoretical model
In this section, the representative agent production model under risk is developed.
The farmer is assumed to be risk-averse and produces a single output q. Let p denote
output price, f(.) the production function assumed continuous and twice diﬀerentiable,
X the vector of inputs, and r the corresponding vector of unit input prices. The farmer is
assumed to incur production risk, as crop yield might be aﬀected by climatic conditions.
This risk is represented by a random variable ε, whose distribution G(.) is exogenous
to farmer’s actions. This is the only source of risk we consider as prices p and r are
assumed non-random and farms are assumed to be price-takers both in the input and
output markets.
Water (input Xw) is assumed to be an essential input in the production process.
Eﬃciency in water use, assumed to vary between farms, is captured by incorporating in
the production function parameter h(α), where α represents farmer’s characteristics. The
production function will thus be written q = f(h(α)Xw,X−w), where X−w is the vector
of all inputs except water.
Allowing for risk aversion, the farmer’s problem is to maximize expected utility of
proﬁt:
max
X E [U(Π)] = max
X
Z
[U(pf (ε,h(α)Xw,X−w) − r
0X)]dG(ε), (1)
where U(.) is the Von Neuman-Morgenstern utility function. Given that p and rw are not
random, the ﬁrst-order condition for irrigation water input Xw is:





















4where U0 = ∂U(Π)/∂Π. For a risk-neutral producer, the ratio of input price over output
price, (rw/p), equals the expected marginal productivity of Xw, E[∂f(ε,h(α)Xw,X−w)/∂Xw].
When the producer is risk-averse, the second term in the right-hand side of (2), cov(U0,∂f (ε,h(α)Xw,X−w)/∂Xw)/E(U0),
is diﬀerent from zero, and measures deviations from the risk-neutrality case. More pre-
cisely, this term is proportional and has the opposite sign, to the marginal risk premium
with respect to Xw.
Proof: The Arrow-Pratt risk-premium R(X) is deﬁned as the amount of money that
should be given to the risk-averse farmer for him to behave as a risk-neutral agent. A
risk-neutral agent would maximize expected proﬁt:
max
X [p × Ef (ε,h(α)Xw,X−w) − r
0X − R(X)].
















− rw = −
p × cov(U0,∂f (ε,h(α)Xw,X−w)/∂Xw)
E(U0)
.
Optimal water use X∗
w is the solution of equation (2). To derive an analytical solution
to this equation, we would need to specify the farmer’s preferences (its utility function
U(.)), the production process (f(.)) and the distribution of the random variable repre-
senting risk (G(.)). To remain as general as possible, we simply write optimal water use as
an unspeciﬁed function of input and output prices, technology, preferences and marginal
risk-premium.
We now incorporate in our model the decision to adopt a new irrigation technology.
This decision is modelled as a binary choice, where the farmer can choose to adopt (i = 1)
or not (i = 0) an innovative irrigation technology. This technology increases water use
eﬃciency (h1(α) > h0(α) for 0 < α < 1), that is, if the farmer uses the new technology,
less water will be necessary to produce the same level of output. Adopting the new
technology implies a ﬁxed cost (I1 > 0 and I0 = 0) and might change the marginal cost
of water (r1
w 6= r0
w). Denote X1 (respectively X0) the optimal input choices if the new
technology is (respectively is not) adopted. Thus, the ﬁrst order condition for water input


















































The farmer will adopt the new irrigation technology if the expected utility with adoption


































































Thus, the farmer’s technology adoption choice depends on input and output prices, the
ﬁxed cost of the new technology, parameters of production technology, preferences and
corresponding input-speciﬁc risk-premia, the distribution of risk and the farmer’s char-
acteristics. The empirical application of the above theoretical model follows a two-step
procedure. First, it adopts Antle’s (1983, 1987) approach, that allows estimation of the
farmer’s attitudes towards risk without speciﬁcation of any of the above parameters that
aﬀect farmer’s choice. Second, it incorporates the estimated risk attitudes in a traditional
discrete choice econometric model that allows estimation of the parameters aﬀecting the
decision to adopt a technological innovation.
3 Empirical Application
3.1 Data Description
The dataset used in this study is extracted from a broader dataset, collected via a
survey on the structural characteristics of the agricultural sector in Crete, ﬁnanced by
the Regional Directorate of Crete in the context of the Regional Development Program
1995-99 (Liodakis, 2000). The sample consists of 265 randomly selected farms located in
the four major districts of Crete, namely Chania, Rethymno, Heraklio and Lasithi, during
the 1995-96 period. The survey provides detailed information about production patterns,
input use, average yields, gross revenues, structural characteristics and the number of
farms adopted modern irrigation technologies during the year of the survey. Descriptive
statistics are provided in Table 1.
6Table 1. Descriptive Statistics.
Variable Adopters Non-Adopters
Economic Data:
Crop Output (in Kgs) 18,234 21,439
Livestock Output (in Kgs) 1,542 2,504
Land (stremmas1) 45 56
Labour (in hours) 452 530
Chemical Inputs (in Kgs) 12,405 16,212
Capital Stock2 (in Euros) 2,634 3,247
Irrigation Water (in m3) 140 176
Total Cost (in Euros) 36,189 45,198
Total Revenue (in Euros) 53,276 65,871
Proﬁts (in Euros) 17,087 20,673
Farm Characteristics:
Farmer’s Age (years) 36 56
Farmer’s Education (years) 11 6
Farm’s Debts (in Euros) 2,921 893
Subsidies (in Euros) 1,194 444
Extension Visits (No visits) 9 2
Access to Information (1=yes, 0=no) 0.471 0
Index of Relative Risk Premium 0.460 0.522
Aridity Index3 1.188 0.603
Soil type: (% of farms)
Clayey Sandy 10.3 41.0
Clayey Limestones 40.2 19.7
Marly Limestones 41.4 15.7
Dolomitic Limestones 8.0 23.6
No of Farms 87 178
Notes:
1 One stremma equals 0.1 ha.
2 Capital stock was estimated using the perpetual inventory method
2 as described in Ball et al., (2001).
3 Aridity index is deﬁned as the ratio of the average annual temperature
3 in the area over total annual precipitation.
In the sample of this survey, 87 out of 265 farms (32.8%) have adopted modern ir-
rigation technologies. These technologies vary from simple sprinklers applied mainly in
tree crops to greenhouse integrated systems that control the irrigation of the plantation.
7The adopting farms are of smaller size (45 stremmas or 4.5 ha on the average) and with
lower capital stock (2,634 euros). Although, farms adopting new irrigation technologies
have lower proﬁts compared with their non-adopters counterparts (17,087 and 20,673 eu-
ros, respectively), they exhibit higher average proﬁtability per stremma 380.1 and 370.2
euros/stremma, respectively. Finally, the average irrigation water use per stremma is 2.8
and 3.3 m3 for adopters and non-adopters, respectively.
In Table 1 we also present information on socio-economic and structural character-
istics of the surveyed farms. From the data presented, it is evident that older farmers,
who are in general less educated than their younger counterparts, are not adopting new
technologies as eagerly. The average age and education level of farmers that adopted
modern irrigation technologies is 36 and 11 years, respectively, whereas for farmers using
traditional technologies the corresponding values are 56 and 6 years. Furthermore, farms
with higher debts and received subsidies, are more likely to have adopted new irrigation
technologies. It is also interesting to note that average debt for adopting farms is 2,921
euros, whereas the corresponding ﬁgure for farms that are using traditional irrigation
practices only 893 euros . Similarly the level of subsidies is also almost three times the
level subsidies for innovative farms (1,194 and 444 euros, respectively). Although subsi-
dies refer mainly to direct income transfers from CAP (common agiculture policy) and
thus are not related with farmers’ adoption process, it seems that it provides them with
the ﬁnancial viability necessary for investing in new technologies.
Another interesting point that arises from the data presented in Table 1, refers to the
exposition of farmers to extension services (private or public) and their access to gen-
eral farming information. Speciﬁcally, farmers adopting new irrigation technologies are
visited by extension agents on average nine times during the cropping year, whereas farm-
ers insisting on traditional irrigation technologies are visited only two times on average.
Further, farmers that adopt new technologies have better access to farming related infor-
mation from various sources (e.g. newspapers, television and radio, visits to agricultural
product fairs and shows, sporadic attendance of seminars, meetings or demonstrations and
so on). Finally, farms enjoying less favorable environmental conditions seem to be among
the adopters of new irrigation technologies; that is farms facing higher average annual
temperature and/or lower annual precipitation have on average adopted new irrigation
technologies more intensively.
3.2 The Empirical Model
As already indicated, the derivation of an analytical solution to (7) would require the
speciﬁcation of preferences through a utility function, technology and the distribution of
(ε). To avoid too many ad hoc speciﬁcations, we adopt a two-stage procedure. In the
ﬁrst step, we assess risk attitudes using Antle’s (1983, 1987) ﬂexible estimation approach,
that has the advantage of requiring only information on proﬁt, price and input quantities.
In the second step, we incorporate these risk attitudes among the explanatory variables
of a probit econometric model, in order to explain the binary choice of whether to adopt
or not a technological innovation.
8They key feature of the ﬂexible approach we use in the ﬁrst step of our estimation
procedure is that the farmer’s maximization problem is equivalent to maximizing a func-
tion of moments of the distribution of proﬁt (or equivalently, the distribution of ε), those
moments having themselves X as arguments. There is no loss in generality here because
these function of moments, denoted by F(.), is completely unspeciﬁed. Moreover, the
focus of our estimation procedure on a population of producers rather than on individual
producers, avoids aggregation problems.
Under the assumptions that each farmer solves a single period maximization problem
in which inputs are predetermined variables, all farmers have the same proﬁt distribution
and form the same expectations, the farmer’s program becomes:
max
X E [U(Π)] = F [µ1(X),µ2(X),...,µm(X)],
where µj, j = 1,2,...,m is the jth moment of proﬁt. The ﬁrst order condition of the






















We index by k = 1,...K inputs used in the production process and we assume that the
farmer is concerned only by the ﬁrst three moments of the distribution of proﬁt. The
marginal contribution of input k to the expected proﬁt is given by ∂µ1(X)/∂Xk, which is
written as a linear combination of the marginal contributions of input k to the variance
(∂µ2(X)/∂Xk) and skewness (∂µ3(X)/∂Xk) of expected proﬁt. Hence the following model
will be estimated for each input k:
∂µ1(X)
∂Xk








θjk = −(∂F(X)/∂µj(X))/(∂F(X)/∂µ1(X)) × (1/j!), j = 1,...,3,
and uk is the usual econometric error term. θ2k and θ3k are directly related to the theory
of decision under risk, as (2θ2k) and (−6θ3k) are good approximations of Arrow-Pratt
(AP) and down-side (DS) coeﬃcients of risk-aversion, respectively. The risk-premium is







for each k (9)
where µ2 and µ3 are respectively a measure of the second- and third-order moments of the
distribution. RPk > 0 would mean that the farmer is characteized by a positive willingnss
to pay to be insured against the risk associated with the use of input k. Coeﬃcients θ2k
9and θ3k can aslo be interpreted as a measure of the marginal contribution of each of the
two higher moments to the risk premium.
As indicated above, farm-speciﬁc relative risk premium for water input, is used in
the second stage of our empirical model in order to proxy farm-speciﬁc risk attitudes.
That is, this variable is then included in the discrete choice model that explains the
probability of technology adoption as a function of risk attitudes, farmers’ socio-economic
characteristics and farm-speciﬁc qualitative and ﬁnancial characteristics. Recall from
section 2 that the farmer will choose to adopt the innovate irrigation technology if Y ∗
i ≡
E [U(Π1
i)] − E [U(Π0
i)] > 0. Y ∗
i is an unobservable random index for each farmer that
deﬁnes their propensity to choose to adopt a new irrigation technology. For purposes of





iβ + ei > 0 (10)
where Zi is a vector of regressors containing socio-economic (including risk attitudes)
producer-speciﬁc characteristics, as well as quality, ﬁnancial and information acquisi-
tion farm-speciﬁc characteristics, which determine the decision whether to adopt a new
technology. β is a vector of parameters to be estimated and ei is an error term. The
binary choice is deﬁned by assuming a popability density function (pdf) for ei and let-
ting the random variable Yi = 1 if Y ∗
i > 0 and Yi = 0 if Y ∗
i ≤ 0. Equation (10) will









Table 2 reports the estimated risk parameters obtained from applying (8), to the
data described in section 3.1, and calculating the relevant risk premium for water input
using equation (9).
Table 2. Estimation of the risk-aversion measures.
Risk Parameter Estimate Std Error
Constant -0.0267 0.0585
θ2k (associated with AP) 0.9327 0.4446
θ3k (associated with DS) -0.9692 0.2049
Results confront to expectation and show that farmers are risk-averse. Firstly, the con-
stant term is not signiﬁcant, which indicates that irrigation water, the input under con-
sideration is eﬃciently used, in the sense that expected marginal return is equal to the
factor price.1 The eﬃciency of the farmers allows application of Antle’s method which
assumes proﬁt maximizing behaviour. Secondly, the θ2 parameter associated with the sec-
ond moment (variance) of proﬁt is positive and signiﬁcant, which indicates that farmers
1This also indicates that the empirical model is correctly speciﬁed.
10exhibit Arrow-Pratt risk aversion, i.e. they are willing to sacriﬁce a proportion of their
expected proﬁt in order to avoid the risk associated with water input in their production.
Thirdly, the parameter linked to the third moment (skewness) of proﬁt is negative and
signiﬁcant, which indicates that farmers also exhibit down-side risk aversion; i.e. they are
risk averse to a proﬁt distribution that is skewed towards negative values.
The ﬂexible estimation of the stochastic production function allows us to calculate the
relative risk that each farmer in the sample is willing to pay in order to avoid the risk
associated with water used as an input in his/her production. This variable (the relative
risk premium) is then used in the estimation of the choice model in order to investigate
whether risk attitudes aﬀect the decision to adopt a new irrigation technology. Table 3
reports the eﬀects of all variables on the decision to adopt.2 With the exception of the
dummy variables indicating limestones soils (both clayey and marly) and location of farms
in the region of Chania, all other variables included in the estimated probit model are
signiﬁcant at either 99% or 95% signiﬁcance levels. In general, their signs conform to
expectation and validate the theoretical model of section 2.
Table 3: Parameter estimates of the probit model.
Variable Estimate Standard Error
Constant -4.6812 (1.9033)*
Farmer’s Age -0.0854 (0.0304)*
Farmer’s Education 0.2045 (0.0847)*
Aridity Index 1.9626 (0.7472)*
Farm’s Debts 0.0009 (0.0002)*
Extension Visits 0.0422 (0.0157)*
Access to Information 0.3110 (0.1043)*
Relative Risk Premium 0.1049 (0.0370)*
Subsidies 0.0038 (0.0008)*
Clayey Sandy 0.5558 (0.2787)**
Clayey Limestones -0.1744 (0.3749)




% of Correct Prediction 97.84
McFadden’s R2 94.40
* (**) signiﬁcant at the 1 (5)% level.
One useful expedient is to calculate the value of the derivatives at the mean values of
all the independent variables in the sample. The motivation is to display the derivative for
2In the probit model, the derivative of the probability with respect to the independent variables varies
with the level of these variables. As a result, it is not generally useful to report the coeﬃcients from a
probit, unless only the sign and signiﬁcance of the coeﬃcients are of interest.
11a “typical” element of the sample. These derivatives are reported in table 4 and represent
the marginal eﬀect of each regressor, which approximates the change in the probability of
adoption at the regressors’ mean. Standard errors were obtained using block resampling
techniques, which entails grouping the data randomly in a number of blocks of ﬁve farms
and reestimating the model leaving out each time one of the blocks of observations and
then computing the corresponding standard errors (Politis and Romano, 1994).
Table 4: Marginal eﬀects on the probability of adoption.
Variable Estimate Standard Error
Farmer’s Age -0.02978 (0.0092)*
Farmer’s Education 0.07128 (0.0234)*
Aridity Index 0.68394 (0.1546)*
Farm’s Debts 0.00031 (0.0002)**
Subsidies 0.00132 (0.0003)*
Extension Visits 0.01471 (0.0033)*
Access to Information 0.10838 (0.0542)**
Relative Risk Premium 0.03656 (0.0102)*
Subsidies 0.00132 (0.0003)*
Clayey Sandy 0.19371 (0.0653)*
Clayey Limestones -0.06077 (0.0843)




* (**) signiﬁcant at the 1 (5)% level.
The variable of particular interest to this paper is the farmer-speciﬁc relative risk
premium. This variable proxies the risk attitudes of each farmer in the sample and
turns out to have a positive and signiﬁcant eﬀect on the decision to adopt new irrigation
technologies. That is, farmers that are more risk-averse with respect to their use of water
are more likely to adopt new technologies that allow them to save water and decrease
their production (yield) risk arising from water crop requirements. This result provides
evidence that farmers invest in new technologies as a means to hedge against input related
production risk.
As indicated in table 4, the older the farmer the less inclined he is to adopt new
irrigation technologies, while the more educated his/she is the higher the probability that
he/she adopts relevant technologies in their production. Moreover, as expected the more
arid the location of the farm the higher the probability of adopting new water-saving
irrigation technologies that help the farm face non-favorable environmental conditions.
In addition, ﬁnancial variable seem to aﬀect the probability to adopt. Farmers with
higher debts as well as higher subsidies are more likely to adopt. As already indicated
in the section 3.1, these subsidies refer mainly to direct income transfers implied by
the respective common market organization of the CAP and thus are not related with
12farmers’ adoption process. However, it seems that they provide the farmers with the
ﬁnancial viability necessary for investing in new technologies.
The exposition of the farmers to extension services (private or public) and their access
to general farming information also increase the probability to adopt the new technology.
That is farmers that adopt new technologies have better access to farming information
from various sources (e.g. newspapers television and radio, visits to agricultural product
fairs and shows, sporadic attendance of seminars, meetings or demonstrations and so on).
As far as soil dummies are concerned clayey sandy soils have a positive and signiﬁcant
eﬀect on the decision to adopt. This can be explain by the fact that sandy soils require
more water as they have high absorbing capacity than other types of soil, hence giving rise
to incentives for water conservation through adoption of new technologies. The regional
dummies for Chania and Lasithi are signiﬁcant in explaining adoption technology. The
diﬀerence in their signs indicates diﬀerences in cultivated crops between these two areas.
In Lasithi green houses, which water intensive, are numerous and as a result respective
farmers are more inclined to adopt a water-saving new technology. On the other hand,
in Chania farmers mostly cultivate olive-trees with signiﬁcantly lower water requirements
and as a reduced incentives for investing in expensive water-saving irrigation technologies.
4 Conclusions
The main objective of this paper was to present a theoretical framework that concep-
tualizes adoption as a decision process involving information acquisition by farmers who
face yield uncertainty and vary in their risk preferences. To do this we have constructed
the relevant theoretical model by integrating the microeconomic foundations of decision
making under production uncertainty at the farm level with the traditional technological
adoption models.
The application of this theoretical model involves a two-step procedure. In the ﬁrst
step we apply Antle (1987) ﬂexible method of moments, which enables estimation of
the stochastic technology without ad hoc speciﬁcation of risk preferences and derivation
of input and farmer speciﬁc risk attitudes. In th second stage, these risk attitudes are
incorporated in a discrete-choice model which explains farmer’s decision to adopt irrigation
technologies as a function of farmers’ socio-economic characteristics, farm-speciﬁc ﬁnancial
and qualitative characteristics, as well as farmers’ risk attitudes.
The proposed model is applied to a randomly selected sample of 265 farms located
in Crete, Greece. Results show that risk preferences aﬀect the probability of adoption
and provide evidence that farmers invest in new technologies as a means to hedge against
input related production risk. As a conclusion, this study shows that neglecting risk when
assessing the choice of technology adoption could provide misleading guidance to policy
makers. More precisely, we assess here that the second and third moments of the proﬁt
distribution inﬂuence farmer’s decision to adopt a new technology and should be taken
into account when policies that attempt to aﬀect technology adoption are considered.
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